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INTRODUCTION: 
PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT 
AND THE CONSENT DILEMMA 
Daniel J. Solove∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, the problems involving information priva-
cy — the ascendance of Big Data and fusion centers, the tsunami of 
data security breaches, the rise of Web 2.0, the growth of behavioral 
marketing, and the proliferation of tracking technologies — have be-
come thornier.  Policymakers have proposed and passed significant 
new regulation in the United States and abroad, yet the basic approach 
to protecting privacy has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s.  
Under the current approach, the law provides people with a set of 
rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their  
data.  These rights consist primarily of rights to notice, access, and 
consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data.  
The goal of this bundle of rights is to provide people with control over 
their personal data, and through this control people can decide for 
themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, 
or disclosure of their information.  I will refer to this approach to pri-
vacy regulation as “privacy self-management.”  
Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent.  It attempts to be 
neutral about substance — whether certain forms of collecting, using, 
or disclosing personal data are good or bad — and instead focuses on 
whether people consent to various privacy practices.  Consent legiti-
mizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. 
Although privacy self-management is certainly a laudable and nec-
essary component of any regulatory regime, I contend that it is being 
tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.  Privacy self-
management does not provide people with meaningful control over 
their data.  First, empirical and social science research demonstrates 
that there are severe cognitive problems that undermine privacy self-
management.  These cognitive problems impair individuals’ ability to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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make informed, rational choices about the costs and benefits of con-
senting to the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data. 
Second, and more troubling, even well-informed and rational indi-
viduals cannot appropriately self-manage their privacy due to several 
structural problems.  There are too many entities collecting and using 
personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their privacy 
separately with each entity.  Moreover, many privacy harms are the  
result of an aggregation of pieces of data over a period of time by dif-
ferent entities.  It is virtually impossible for people to weigh the costs 
and benefits of revealing information or permitting its use or transfer 
without an understanding of the potential downstream uses, further 
limiting the effectiveness of the privacy self-management framework. 
In addition, privacy self-management addresses privacy in a series 
of isolated transactions guided by particular individuals.  Privacy costs 
and benefits, however, are more appropriately assessed cumulatively 
and holistically — not merely at the individual level.  As several Arti-
cles in this Symposium demonstrate, privacy has an enormous social 
impact.  Professor Neil Richards argues that privacy safeguards intel-
lectual pursuits, and that there is a larger social value to ensuring ro-
bust and uninhibited reading, speaking, and exploration of ideas.1  
Professor Julie Cohen argues that innovation depends upon privacy, 
which is increasingly under threat as Big Data mines information 
about individuals and as media-content providers track people’s con-
sumption of ideas through technology.2  Moreover, in a number of  
cases, as Professor Lior Strahilevitz contends, privacy protection has 
distributive effects; it benefits some people and harms other people.3  
Privacy thus does more than just protect individuals.  It fosters a cer-
tain kind of society, since people’s decisions about their own privacy 
affect society, not just themselves.  Because individual decisions to 
consent to data collection, use, or disclosure might not collectively 
yield the most desirable social outcome, privacy self-management often 
fails to address these larger social values.  
With each sign of failure of privacy self-management, however, the 
typical response by policymakers, scholars, and others is to call for 
more and improved privacy self-management.  In this Article, I argue 
that in order to advance, privacy law and policy must face the prob-
lems with privacy self-management and start forging a new direction. 
Any solution must confront a complex dilemma with consent.  
Consent to collection, use, and disclosure of personal data is often  
not meaningful, but the most apparent solution — paternalistic 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1945–52 (2013).   
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measures — even more directly denies people the freedom to make 
consensual choices about their data.  Paternalism would be easy to jus-
tify if many uses of data had little benefit or were primarily detri-
mental to the individual or society.  But many uses of data have bene-
fits in addition to costs, and individuals could rationally reach opposite 
conclusions regarding whether the benefits outweigh the costs.  Mak-
ing the choice for individuals restrains their ability to consent.  Thus, 
to the extent that legal solutions follow a path away from privacy self-
management and toward paternalism, they are likely to limit consent.  
A way out of this dilemma remains elusive. 
Until privacy law recognizes the true depth of the difficulties of 
privacy self-management and confronts the consent dilemma, privacy 
law will not be able to progress much further.  In this Article, I will 
propose several ways privacy law can grapple with the consent dilem-
ma and move beyond relying too heavily on privacy self-management. 
I.  PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT 
Privacy self-management has its origins in the Fair Information 
Practices, which are also commonly referred to as the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs).4  The FIPPs officially appeared in a 1973 
report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) to address concerns about the increasing digitization of data.  
The principles included (1) transparency of record systems of personal 
data, (2) the right to notice about such record systems, (3) the right to 
prevent personal data from being used for new purposes without con-
sent, (4) the right to correct or amend one’s records, and (5) responsibil-
ities on the holders of data to prevent its misuse.5  These principles 
were embodied selectively in various statutes in the United States, and 
they helped shape the OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980 and the 
APEC Privacy Framework of 2004.6 
Nearly all instantiations of the FIPPs fail to specify what data may 
be collected or how it may be used.  Instead, most forms of data collec-
tion, use, and disclosure are permissible under the FIPPs if individuals 
have the ability to self-manage their privacy — that is, if they are noti-
fied and provide consent. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, BOB GELLMAN 9–10 
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPPShistory.pdf.   
 5 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–
42 (1973). 
 6 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980); ASIA-
PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2004); Gellman, supra note 4, at 7.   
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Privacy self-management is so widely accepted that even deep  
disputes about privacy protection turn on different interpretations and 
applications of it.  In 2012, for example, both the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the White House, dissatisfied with the current reg-
ulatory approach, issued major new frameworks for protecting privacy.  
At the foundation of both, however, is the same old privacy self-
management model.  The FTC framework aims to “[m]ake infor-
mation collection and use practices transparent” and to provide people 
with “the ability to make decisions about their data at a relevant time 
and context.”7  A centerpiece of the White House’s proposed Consum-
er Bill of Rights is the right of consumers to exercise “appropriate con-
trol” over their personal data and to have “clear and simple choices, 
presented at times and in ways that enable consumers to make mean-
ingful decisions about personal data collection, use, and disclosure.”8 
As I will argue in this Part, however, privacy self-management  
faces several problems that together demonstrate that this paradigm 
alone cannot serve as the centerpiece of a viable privacy regulatory re-
gime.  I will discuss two broad types of problems: (1) cognitive prob-
lems, which concern challenges caused by the way humans make deci-
sions, and (2) structural problems, which concern challenges arising 
from how privacy decisions are designed. 
A.  Cognitive Problems 
A number of cognitive problems plague privacy self-management.  
Privacy self-management envisions an informed and rational person 
who makes appropriate decisions about whether to consent to various 
forms of collection, use, and disclosure of personal data.  But empirical 
evidence and social science literature demonstrate that people’s actual 
ability to make such informed and rational decisions does not even 
come close to the vision contemplated by privacy self-management. 
1.  The Problem of the Uninformed Individual. — Two of the most 
important components of privacy self-management are informing indi-
viduals about the data collected and used about them (notice) and al-
lowing them to decide whether they accept such collection and uses 
(choice).  These components of the FIPPs are widely embraced in the 
United States,9 an approach termed “notice and choice.”  Entities have 
normalized the practice of providing notice and choice by offering pri-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE, at i (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 8 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 47 (2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 9 See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Conference of Western Attorneys 
General Annual Meeting, Privacy 3.0 Panel (July 20, 2010). 
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vacy notices and a choice to opt out of some of the forms of data col-
lection and use described in the notices.  
The FTC has stepped in to serve as an enforcer of privacy notices.  
Since 1998, the FTC has maintained that breaking promises made in a 
privacy notice constitutes “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce” in violation of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.10  When it finds such a violation, the FTC can bring civil actions 
and seek injunctive remedies.11  The notice and choice approach has 
also been a centerpiece of privacy legislation.  The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA),12 for example, requires financial institutions to 
provide customers with privacy notices and to allow customers to opt 
out of data sharing with third parties.13 
Despite the embrace of notice and choice, people do not seem to be 
engaging in much privacy self-management.  Most people do not read 
privacy notices on a regular basis.14  As for other types of notices, such 
as end-user license agreements and contract boilerplate terms, studies 
show only a miniscule percentage of people read them.15  Moreover, 
few people opt out of the collection, use, or disclosure of their data 
when presented with the choice to do so.16  Most people do not even 
bother to change the default privacy settings on websites.17  As FTC 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).  For background about the FTC’s enforcement regarding priva-
cy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 820–31 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
 11 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m). 
 12 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C). 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)–(b) (2006). 
 14 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 105 (2010) (discussing a 2006 study 
showing that only 20% of people read privacy notices “most of the time” (quoting TRUSTe & 
TNS, Consumers Have a False Sense of Security About Online Privacy: Actions Inconsistent with 
Attitudes, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/consumers-have-false-sense 
-of-security-about-online-privacy---actions-inconsistent-with-attitudes-55969467.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Infor-
mation Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343, 361–62 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); George R. Milne & Mary J. 
Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) 
Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20–21 (2004) (finding that only 
4.5% of respondents said they always read website privacy notices and 14.1% frequently  
read them).   
 15 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–78 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? 
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 178 (2011) (discussing a study that revealed that people accessed contract 
boilerplate terms far less than 1% of the time). 
 16 See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Pri-
vacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2002) (stating that according 
to one survey, “only 0.5% of banking customers had exercised their opt-out rights”). 
 17 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY 363, 369 (Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costas 
Lambrinoudakis & Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati eds., 2008). 
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Chairman Jon Leibowitz has concluded: “Initially, privacy policies 
seemed like a good idea.  But in practice, they often leave a lot to be 
desired.  In many cases, consumers don’t notice, read, or understand 
the privacy policies.”18 
Why are so few people engaging in privacy self-management?  One 
possible explanation is that privacy notices are long and difficult to 
comprehend.19  There have been many proposals to shorten and sim-
plify privacy policies, though these types of measures have not been 
shown to significantly improve comprehension.20  For example, Profes-
sor M. Ryan Calo suggests that “visceral notice” may resuscitate the 
notice approach by attempting to make people experience notice more 
directly and emotionally.21  As an example, Calo references the FDA’s 
effort to require graphic warnings, including images of death, on ciga-
rettes.22  While smoking warnings may be effective because cancer and 
death are such concrete and terrible consequences, privacy warnings 
are more difficult to translate into visceral terms because the conse-
quences are much more abstract. 
There is a more difficult problem with proposals for improved no-
tice, whether simplified or more visceral.  Such proposals neglect a 
fundamental dilemma of notice: making it simple and easy to under-
stand conflicts with fully informing people about the consequences of 
giving up data, which are quite complex if explained in sufficient de-
tail to be meaningful.  People need a deeper understanding and back-
ground to make informed choices.  Many privacy notices, however, are 
vague about future uses of data. 
Moreover, as Strahilevitz notes in this Symposium, privacy choices 
are often binary, such as with the Do Not Call Registry that allows 
people to choose whether to opt out of telemarketing solutions.23  Many 
people might desire more granularity in their choices, but additional 
granularity adds complexity and creates greater risks of confusion. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public: Individuals, the Inter-
net & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on Behav-
ioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & Technology (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf. 
 19 See Annie I. Anton et al., Financial Privacy Policies and the Need for Standardization, 2 
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 36, 42–44 (2004); Janger & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1230–32; 
Erik Sherman, Privacy Policies Are Great — For PhDs, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 2008, 5:31 AM), 
http://industry.bnet.com/technology/1000391/privacypolicies-are-great-for-phds. 
 20 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2012) (“Studies show only marginal improvement in consumer under-
standing where privacy policies get expressed as tables, icons, or labels, assuming the consumer 
even reads them.”). 
 21 See id. at 1034–35. 
 22 Id. at 1069–70. 
 23 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 2038. 
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Compounding the difficulties in providing notice and choice is the 
fact that people operate under woefully incorrect assumptions about 
how their privacy is protected.  One study found that people correctly 
answered only 30% of questions regarding the privacy of their online 
transactions.24  Another study found that “64% [of the people sur-
veyed] do not know that a supermarket is allowed to sell other compa-
nies information about what they buy” and that 75% falsely believe 
that when “a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not 
share my information with other websites and companies.”25 
Thus far, in most situations, people do not engage in privacy self-
management.  The evidence suggests that people are not well informed 
about privacy.  Efforts to improve education are certainly laudable, as 
are attempts to make privacy notices more understandable.  But such 
efforts fail to address a deeper problem — privacy is quite complicat-
ed.  This fact leads to a tradeoff between providing a meaningful no-
tice and providing a short and simple one. 
2.  The Problem of Skewed Decisionmaking. — Even if most people 
were to read privacy policies routinely, people often lack enough exper-
tise to adequately assess the consequences of agreeing to certain pres-
ent uses or disclosures of their data.  People routinely turn over their 
data for very small benefits.26  Some conclude from this fact that con-
sumers do not value privacy highly.27  Some have suggested that there 
might be a generational shift in privacy norms, where young people do 
not care about privacy.28  But in surveys, people routinely declare how 
much they care about privacy, and attitudes about privacy among the 
young and old are, surprisingly, quite similar.29 
There is a clear disconnect between people’s expressed high value 
of privacy and their behavior, which indicates a very low value of pri-
vacy.  Does this mean people actually do not care about privacy?   
Social science literature indicates that this disconnect stems from cer-
tain impediments to rational decisionmaking. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored Advertis-
ing and Three Activities that Enable It 20–21 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214. 
 25 Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAN 
SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE (Univ. of Pa., Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. 2005), available at  
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/downloads/information_and_society/turow_appc_report
_web_final.pdf. 
 26 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in PRIVACY 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 15, 16 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu 
eds., 2006).   
 27 See Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 42.   
 28 See Emily Nussbaum, My So-Called Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004 § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 34. 
 29 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When 
It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies? (Aug. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864. 
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Work in social science — which I will define broadly to encompass 
behavioral economics, psychology, and empirical studies in other  
fields — shows that so many of our cherished assumptions about the 
way people make decisions regarding privacy are false.  As Professors 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein note, the “false assumption is that 
almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their 
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would 
be made by someone else.”30  Studies by Professor Daniel Kahneman, 
Professor Amos Tversky, and others demonstrate the falsity of the tra-
ditional rational agent model of human decisionmaking, as people  
often decide based on heuristics and the way choices are framed.31 
People have “bounded rationality” — they struggle to apply their 
knowledge to complex situations — with regard to privacy.32  As Pro-
fessors Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags observe, “our innate 
bounded rationality limits our ability to acquire, memorize, and pro-
cess all relevant information, and it makes us rely on simplified mental 
models, approximate strategies, and heuristics.”33  Risk assessment is 
also skewed by the “availability heuristic,” where people assess familiar 
dangers as riskier than unfamiliar ones.34 
Social science also reveals that privacy preferences are not devel-
oped in the abstract but in context.  The way choices are framed, and 
many other factors, shape — and tend to skew — privacy prefer-
ences.35  People are also more willing to share personal data when they 
feel in control, regardless of whether that control is real or illusory.  
More generally, “people are more willing to take risks, and judge those 
risks as less severe, when they feel in control.”36 
People may also tend to make certain mistakes in judgment con-
sistently.37  At this point in time, companies, politicians, and others 
seeking to influence choices are only beginning to tap into the insights 
from social science literature, and they primarily still use rather anec-
dotal and unscientific means of persuasion.  When those seeking to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 9 (2008). 
 31 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 411 (2011).  See generally CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky 
eds., 1982). 
 32 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 26, at 25–26.   
 33 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17, at 369. 
 34 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 25.  
 35 Leslie K. John et al., The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Per-
sonal Information (July 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1430482. 
 36 Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Misplaced Confidences: 
Privacy and the Control Paradox, SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 3), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-SPPS.pdf. 
 37 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 240–41 (2008).   
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shape decisions hone their techniques based on these social science in-
sights (ironically enabled by access to ever-increasing amounts of data 
about individuals and their behavior), people’s choices may be more 
controlled than ever before (and also ironically, such choices can be 
structured to make people believe that they are in control). 
The upshot of this problem is that privacy decisions are particularly 
susceptible to problems such as bounded rationality, the availability 
heuristic, and framing effects because privacy is so complex, contextual, 
and difficult to conceptualize. 
 
* * * 
 
The cognitive problems above thus present numerous hurdles for 
privacy self-management: (1) people do not read privacy policies; (2) if 
people read them, they do not understand them; (3) if people read and 
understand them, they often lack enough background knowledge to 
make an informed choice; and (4) if people read them, understand 
them, and can make an informed choice, their choice might be skewed 
by various decisionmaking difficulties.  The situation nearly approach-
es that faced by the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s parable Before the 
Law where the gateway was guarded by an infinite set of doorkeepers, 
each more powerful than the next.38 
B.  Structural Problems 
Even assuming that people are fully informed and rational, that 
there is a way to protect their decisions from being skewed, and that 
there is a way to capture their preferences accurately, privacy self-
management also faces serious structural problems.  These structural 
problems involve impediments to one’s ability to adequately assess the 
costs and benefits of consenting to various forms of collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal data.  Structuring meaningful privacy decisions 
proves to be an immensely difficult endeavor. 
1.  The Problem of Scale. — A person may be able to manage her 
privacy with a few entities, but privacy self-management does not 
scale well.  Even if every entity provided people with an easy and 
clear way to manage their privacy, there are simply too many entities 
that collect, use, and disclose people’s data for the rational person to 
handle.  In particular, the average American visits nearly a hundred 
websites per month and does business online and offline with countless 
companies (merchant, utility, insurance, technology, travel, financial, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 215 (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925). 
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etc.).39  Not only will people struggle to manage privacy with the enti-
ties they know about, but there are also scores of entities that traffic in 
personal data without people ever being aware.  People cannot manage 
their privacy with regard to these extensive “reservoirs” of data unless 
they know these reservoirs exist and can identify the various entities 
that maintain them.40 
The problem is reminiscent of the beleaguered student whose pro-
fessors collectively assign too much reading each night.  From the per-
spective of each professor, the reading is a reasonable amount for an 
evening.  But when five or six simultaneously assign a night’s worth of 
reading, the amount collectively becomes far too much.  Thus, even if 
all companies provided notice and adequate choices, this data man-
agement problem would persist; the average person just does not have 
enough time or resources to manage all the entities that hold her data.  
One study estimated it would cost $781 billion in lost productivity if 
everyone were to read every privacy policy at websites they visited in 
a one-year period.41  And many entities frequently modify their priva-
cy policies, so reading them all just once is not enough.  The problem 
exists with opt-out policies as well as with opt-in policies. 
Many entities want to do the right thing and be open about their 
privacy practices and how people’s data will be used.  However, even 
with simple, conspicuous, and understandable privacy policies, the 
problem of scale persists. 
2.  The Problem of Aggregation. — Another problem is that even if 
people made rational decisions about sharing individual pieces of data 
in isolation, they greatly struggle to factor in how their data might be 
aggregated in the future.  Suppose a person gives out an innocuous 
piece of data at one point in time, thinking that he or she is not reveal-
ing anything sensitive.  At other points in time, the person reveals 
equally nonsensitive data.  Unexpectedly, this data might be combined 
and analyzed to reveal sensitive facts about the person.  The person 
never disclosed these facts nor anticipated that they would be uncov-
ered.  The problem was that the person gave away too many clues.  
Modern data analytics, which is also loosely referred to as data mining 
or “Big Data,” can deduce extensive information about a person from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 See August 2011 — Top US Web Brands, NIELSEN WIRE (Sept. 30, 2011), http://blog 
.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/august-2011-top-us-web-brands/. 
 40 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law 
at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243–51 (2007). 
 41 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. 
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 564 (2008). 
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these clues.  In other words, little bits of innocuous data can say a lot 
in combination.42  I have referred to this as the “aggregation effect.”43 
The difficulty with the aggregation effect is that it makes it nearly 
impossible to manage data.  The types of new information that can be 
gleaned from analyzing existing information and the kinds of predic-
tions that can be made from this data are far too vast and complex, 
and are evolving too quickly, for people to fully assess the risks and 
benefits involved.  This state of affairs makes it very hard to assess 
whether revealing any piece of information will sometime later on, 
when combined with other data, reveal something sensitive. 
The costs and benefits of each situation depend on the collective set 
of previous disclosure decisions.  At Time 1, it might make sense for a 
person to reveal Fact 1.  At Time 2, the person might decide to reveal 
Fact 2.  What is hard to determine is whether at Time 3 Facts 1 and 2 
might be combined to reveal Fact 3, and whether the person would be 
harmed by the knowledge or use of Fact 3.  But at the time of reveal-
ing Fact 1 and Fact 2, the person might have no idea that Fact 1 plus 
Fact 2 would yield Fact 3. 
In the real world, we do not have just a few facts, but thousands of 
pieces of data.  Suppose that over the course of the past decade, a per-
son gives out 50,000 pieces of data.  The person has not been negative-
ly affected by revealing these pieces of data.  One day, the person re-
veals Fact 50,001, a relatively innocuous fact that gets combined with 
some of the other facts the person provided many years ago to reveal 
Fact 50,002.  Deduced via a newly created algorithm, this fact proves 
harmful to the person. 
Of course, Fact 50,002 could turn out to be beneficial to the person 
or to society as a whole — perhaps it reveals that the person is at risk 
for contracting a highly contagious and lethal disease.  The point is 
that it is virtually impossible for a person to make meaningful judg-
ments about the costs and benefits of revealing certain data.  There-
fore, in many situations, too much is unknown to make a meaningful 
decision about costs and benefits at the time that people are asked to 
manage their privacy. 
To enable a person to make a rational decision about sharing data, 
that person would need to have an understanding of the range of pos-
sible harms and benefits so as to do a cost-benefit analysis.  Of course, 
people make decisions in the face of uncertainty all the time, but they 
often do so quite badly.  As psychologist Daniel Gilbert has noted, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 In addition to learning new information by combining bits and pieces of old information, 
data analytics can make predictions about future behavior.  Big Data might know something 
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people’s predictions about how various events will affect their future 
happiness are remarkably inaccurate.44 
Another challenge is that aggregation alters the identifiability of 
other data.  Privacy regulation is typically triggered by the presence of 
“personally identifiable information” (PII) — defined roughly as infor-
mation that is identifiable to an individual.  Privacy laws typically 
regulate only when PII is involved.45  One problem with PII is that, as 
discussed above, it is not static: the identifiability of data depends  
upon context.46  A search query, for example, is often not inherently 
identifiable.  Its identifiability depends upon the existing data availa-
ble online.  Such was the case with the famous anonymized search re-
sults AOL released, leading to a reporter’s identifying a person based 
on her search queries.47  As data gets aggregated, information that is 
not identifiable can become identified. 
3.  The Problem of Assessing Harm. — Compounding these prob-
lems is the fact that people often favor immediate benefits even when 
there may be future detriments.48  The aggregation effect shows that 
privacy is an issue of long-term information management, while most 
decisions to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of data are tied 
to a short-term benefit. 
Privacy self-management asks people to assess the potential harm 
to themselves early on, typically when the data is initially collected.  
However, for a number of reasons, people will find it immensely chal-
lenging to engage in this cost-benefit analysis.  First, as already dis-
cussed, many privacy harms are cumulative in nature: people may 
agree to many forms of data collection, use, and disclosure over a long 
period of time, and the harmful effects may only emerge from the 
downstream uses of the combination of the data. 
Individual privacy harms, meanwhile, are often small and dis-
persed.  Of course, revealing nude photographs or highly embarrassing 
or discreditable facts can generate substantial emotional distress.  But 
many privacy violations are akin to a bee sting.  Despite this fact, it 
would be wrong to conclude that they ought to be ignored.  One bee 
sting can be shrugged off, but a hundred or a thousand can be lethal.  
Harm from privacy violations can develop gradually over time, but 
decisions about privacy must be made individually, in isolation, and 
far in advance. 
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 44 See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 24–25 (2006). 
 45 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
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 46 See supra p. 1890. 
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 48 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17, at 372. 
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Additionally, privacy self-management fails to account for the so-
cial impacts of individual privacy decisions.  Individual privacy has a 
variety of social functions.  Several scholars have recognized that pri-
vacy is “constitutive” of society.49  Professor Priscilla Regan demon-
strates the need for understanding privacy in terms of its social bene-
fits.50  Professor Joel Reidenberg contends that “[s]ociety as a whole 
has an important stake in the contours of the protection of personal  
information.”51  Professor Spiros Simitis recognizes that “privacy con-
siderations no longer arise out of particular individual problems; rath-
er, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”52  Then-Professor Robert 
Post asserts that privacy protection “safeguards rules of civility that in 
some significant measure constitute both individuals and communi-
ty.”53  Professor Paul Schwartz has further developed the theory of 
constitutive privacy in arguing for privacy’s importance to civil socie-
ty.54  Schwartz focuses on how the protection of information privacy 
will further self-governance and democracy on the Internet.55 
According to Cohen, privacy protection “preserves a zone of infor-
mational autonomy for individuals.”56  Privacy is essential not just to 
our individual development but also to our cultural development.  Our 
intellectual development depends upon the creativity of others, and 
our creativity in turn shapes their intellectual growth.  These forces  
interact to develop a rich culture.  Stunting individual creativity and 
intellectual development impoverishes society at large.57 
Richards’s concept of “intellectual privacy” also recognizes the 
broader social importance of privacy.58  Richards contends that “new 
ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public expo-
sure” and that privacy is essential to promoting intellectual freedom.59  
He also argues that intellectual privacy “should be preserved against 
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 49 E.g., Janger & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1247. 
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private actors as well as against the state” because “[w]e are constrained 
in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state.”60 
Privacy self-management cedes substantial responsibility for pre-
serving privacy to individuals, and it assumes that the primary harm 
to be redressed is nonconsensual data collection, use, or disclosure.  
Although impinging upon consent constitutes harm worthy of redress, 
the collective actions of people regarding privacy can implicate larger 
social values.  Privacy self-management does not prevent, redress, or 
even consider infringements on those social values. 
There is a countervailing social value in certain uses of data, such 
as research uses, which might justify overriding individual decisions.  
As Schwartz and I document elsewhere, data analytics have led to new 
and improved medical treatments, as well as more effective responses 
to data security breaches.61  There are thus social values both in favor 
of and against privacy that are not adequately reflected in privacy self-
management, which focuses too exclusively on individual choice. 
 
* * * 
 
Privacy self-management often asks people to make decisions at an 
early point in time (when information is collected) and at a series of 
isolated instances.  But the true consequences of information use for 
individuals cannot be known when they make these decisions.  Fur-
thermore, the consequences are cumulative, and they cannot be ade-
quately assessed in a series of isolated transactions.  Privacy self-
management’s very structure impedes its ability to achieve its goal of 
giving people meaningful control over their data.  Moreover, its  
narrow focus on individuals neglects the larger social dimensions  
of privacy. 
II.  BEYOND PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT 
Where should privacy law go from here?  Clinging more tightly to 
privacy self-management is not the answer.  Nor is abandoning priva-
cy self-management or embracing paternalistic regulation.  In this 
Part, I propose some guidance for privacy law’s future direction.  Al-
though I am far from ready to propose a complete solution, I can with 
reasonable confidence point out paths that will prove fruitful and 
paths that will not.  
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 60 Id. at 1951. 
 61 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 45, at 1866–68. 
  
1894 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1880 
A.  Navigating the Consent Dilemma 
Through privacy self-management, the law aims to give people 
control over their data.  The core of this control involves people’s 
choices about whether to consent to data collection, use, and disclo-
sure.  As I demonstrated above, people are not able to provide mean-
ingful consent in many situations. 
The most obvious alternative would be for the law to regulate and 
compel certain privacy choices.  Privacy regulation, however, risks be-
coming too paternalistic.  Regulation that sidesteps consent denies 
people the freedom to make choices.  The end result is that either  
people have choices that are not meaningful or people are denied 
choices altogether.  Ironically, paternalistic regulation might limit  
people’s freedom to choose in the name of enhancing their autonomy.  
I term this problem the “consent dilemma.”  Privacy scholars must 
identify a conception of consent that both protects privacy and  
avoids paternalism. 
1.  Rethinking Consent and Paternalism. — Consent is an under-
theorized concept that is crucial for privacy and many other areas of 
law.  Consent performs an enormous amount of work.  Activities that 
would otherwise be illegitimate are made legitimate by consent.  For 
example, a person can agree to maintain confidentiality of data as a 
condition of employment.  The person would ordinarily be free to 
speak about the data under the First Amendment right to free speech 
but has consented to waive this right.62  Indeed, many constitutional 
rights can be waived with consent, including rights that implicate pri-
vacy, such as First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and associ-
ation, the Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right to protection against 
compelled self-incrimination,63 and the right to information privacy.64  
In addition to waiving their constitutional rights, people can consent to 
a wide array of other incursions on their privacy, such as monitoring of 
their communications and drug testing.65 
As I demonstrated earlier, individuals cannot adequately self-
manage their privacy, and consent is not meaningful in many contexts 
involving privacy.  The primary regulatory alternative, endorsed by 
several scholars, is that the law should regulate privacy in a more pa-
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 62 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
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ternalistic manner.  For example, Professor Anita Allen contends that 
privacy is a “‘foundational’ human good[],” one that is essential for a 
free and democratic society.66  She argues that in certain instances, 
privacy must be mandated: “[F]or the sake of foundational human 
goods, liberal societies properly constrain both government coercion 
and individual choice . . . .”67 
Cohen criticizes viewing privacy as something that can always be 
“traded off against other goods.”68  Under her view, individuals should 
not be able to waive privacy in a number of circumstances.  Waiving 
privacy can lead to less creativity and impinge upon the development 
of selfhood.  In her contribution to this Symposium, Cohen contends 
that privacy “is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democrat-
ic political systems.”69  The implication is that the law must override 
individual consent in certain instances. 
The call for increased paternalism stems in part from the fact that 
people appear to be sharing data with increasing frequency and mag-
nitude.  Most people are not opting out as companies gather and use 
data.  They are exposing the intimate minutiae of their lives on sites 
like Facebook and Twitter.  This increased sharing of data is not the 
result of people’s pure preferences.  Their exposure is, in part, a result 
of the fact that many websites are designed to encourage exposure 
while minimizing awareness of the risks.  This problem is made even 
more acute by the fact that many of the users of these sites are teenag-
ers, whose ability to make decisions is not fully mature. 
More broadly, because of the cognitive and structural problems 
with privacy self-management, people consent to the collection, use, 
and disclosure of their personal data when it is not in their self-interest 
to do so.  This tendency lends support to those arguing for paternal-
istic regulation. 
Despite the manifold problems with privacy self-management, 
there are two arguments that counsel against paternalism.  First, the 
correct choices regarding privacy and data use are not always clear.  
For example, although extensive self-exposure can have disastrous 
consequences, many people use social media successfully and produc-
tively.  Suppose a person suffering from bulimia wants to share her 
experiences and medical information with the world.  She is willing to 
suffer the loss of privacy because she finds sharing her experiences to 
be cathartic and empowering.  She also desires to help other people 
suffering from the disorder, and doing so gives her a rewarding sense 
of purpose.  She writes passionately about herself, exposing details that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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could later be seen by employers or others, potentially resulting in a 
loss of employment opportunities.  Should the law forbid her from 
sharing her story?  If the law were to put restrictions on her disclosure, 
then it would be limiting her freedom and autonomy — ironically in 
the name of preserving her freedom and autonomy.  A further problem 
with the paternalistic approach is that the cost-benefit analysis, at least 
in this hypothetical, does not clearly counsel against disclosure.  In 
fact, the benefits might far outweigh the costs.  She might, for exam-
ple, use her exposure to write a book launching a successful career as a 
writer and as a crusader against bulimia. 
Similarly, some people want targeted marketing.  They want their 
data shared.  They want catalogs to be mailed to their homes.  They 
want to be tracked.  They want to be profiled.  They want companies 
to use their personal information to recommend products and services.  
These people should not be dismissed as uninformed or foolish, as it is 
far from clear that the costs to these people outweigh the benefits. 
Second, and more broadly, there are social benefits to data analysis.  
As Professor Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky note, the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal data — even without consent — can lead to 
great benefits for individuals and society.70  For example, many Inter-
net companies that offer free web content use the analysis or sale of 
personal data as the main source of revenue.71  If many people refuse 
to consent to the use of the data, these business models will fail.  Thus, 
structurally, one of the benefits of data collection, use, and disclosure is 
that it pays for online content.  There are deep problems with this 
state of affairs, as people are often not fully aware that they are paying 
for online content with their personal data,72 but legal restrictions on 
this business model would strike many as overly paternalistic. 
In general, the law overrides people’s ability to consent when the 
individual or social harms of what they might consent to clearly out-
weigh the benefits.  The total social costs and benefits of an individu-
al’s waiver of privacy rights are often complicated to weigh.  As 
Strahilevitz notes in this Symposium, various restrictions on the collec-
tion, use, and disclosure of personal data lead to benefits for some 
people and detriments to others.73  Privacy has distributive effects, and 
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this fact makes it more complicated to determine which choice is the 
right one to make.74 
The law generally does not override consent, even with potentially 
dangerous activities.  Individuals can consent to smoking cigarettes 
and drinking alcohol, even though those activities are dangerous.  The 
same is true for playing football or engaging in careers such as coal 
mining or firefighting.  Other consensual activities are prohibited, such 
as prostitution and certain drug use; these activities are seen as having 
little social value.  While these activities may not be distinguishable 
from legal ones for more than historical and moral reasons, they are 
among the small number of consensual activities that are forbidden by 
law.  The choice to surrender one’s privacy does not seem burdened by 
the extreme moral or safety considerations inherent in the small group 
of forbidden consensual activities.  
As a general matter, the law refrains from restricting transactions 
that appear on the surface to be consensual, and the law will tolerate a 
substantial amount of manipulation and even coercion before it deems 
a transaction to be nonconsensual.  Contract law does not second-guess 
every agreement, even lopsided ones where one party did not fare very 
well.  People make decisions all the time that are not in their best in-
terests.  People relinquish rights and take bad risks, and the law often 
does not stop them.  
The EU has a more paternalistic approach to data processing, as 
Schwartz documents in this Symposium.75  EU privacy law has a self-
management component, but it requires a much more stringent and 
explicit form of consent than U.S. privacy law.76  Moreover, EU law is 
more restrictive of data collection, use, and disclosure — it requires  
a legal basis before personal data can be processed, whereas in the 
U.S. data can generally be processed “unless a law specifically forbids  
the activity.”77 
Despite these differences, the EU’s more explicit consent require-
ments do not necessarily lead to people engaging in more meaningful 
cost-benefit analyses regarding the collection and uses of their data.  In 
the EU, consent is certainly more difficult and costly to obtain, some-
times so much so that it can impede beneficial information flow.  
Moreover, EU regulation can be formalistic, and it often provides re-
strictions without any connection to harm.  The regulation can thus 
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hinder processing that does not cause harm and even might be benefi-
cial.  U.S. law, in contrast, generally allows the processing of data un-
less it causes a problem.78  The difficulty with the EU approach is that 
data collection, use, and disclosure are rarely inherently good or bad.  
The costs and benefits depend upon the consequences.  Paternalism is 
much easier to justify when the consequences are clearly bad. 
2.  The Failure of Opt-in Consent. — Some argue that the answer 
to the many problems of consent is to move to a more explicit and af-
firmative method of procuring consent: an opt-in rather than opt-out 
regime.  As stated by FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, companies 
should move to a model where consumers “‘opt in’ when it comes to 
collecting information — especially when it comes to sharing consumer 
information with third parties and sharing it across various web- 
based services.”79 
Despite my early optimism about opt-in, I now believe it will fail.  
One reason is that many organizations will have the sophistication and 
motivation to find ways to generate high opt-in rates.  They can  
do so simply by conditioning products, services, or access on opting in.  
As Schwartz has aptly noted, “many data-processing institutions are 
likely to be good at obtaining consent on their terms regardless of 
whether the default requires consumers to authorize or preclude  
information-sharing.”80 
Moreover, “consumers are likely to be far more sensitive to price 
terms, such as the cost of a checking account, than to nonprice terms 
like the financial institution’s privacy policies and practices.”81  In-
deed, agreeing to clickwrap contracts and end-user license agreements 
is often a prerequisite for obtaining access to a website or to use a 
product or service.  Consider the end-user license agreement to Apple’s 
iTunes Store.82  Periodically, this agreement pops up and people are 
required to agree.  On an iPhone, the text of this agreement often ex-
tends to more than fifty screens.  If people want to download apps 
from the store, they have no choice but to agree.  This requirement is 
akin to an opt-in system — affirmative consent is being sought.  But 
hardly any bargaining or choosing occurs in this process.  Thus, de-
spite regulators’ best intentions, an opt-in system or a requirement of 
affirmative consent for most new uses of data will likely lead to more 
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buttons to click and more forms to sign, but not to more meaningful 
privacy protection. 
Requiring companies to obtain affirmative consent for many new 
uses of data might also be unnecessarily costly and impede socially 
beneficial uses.83  Making consent cumbersome and costly to procure 
can have the de facto effect of restricting certain uses not because peo-
ple will withhold consent, but because the costs of procuring consent 
might prevent entities from engaging in those uses.  The result might 
be to restrict uses of data in a formalistic manner that fails to distin-
guish beneficial from harmful uses.  Some might say that less data col-
lection, use, and disclosure is always a victory, but should privacy win 
out when the benefits of data uses outweigh the privacy costs?  Or 
when individuals would desire a use but are not asked because asking 
would be too costly? 
Some might support opt-in because consumers would be forced to 
pay attention to notifications about how their data will be used and 
disclosed, which people are less likely to know with an opt-out system.  
Despite the knowledge benefit of opt-in, there is a cost.  In opt-in re-
gimes, people affirmatively indicate their consent to data collection 
and sharing.  With this clearer and more legitimate consent, companies 
might feel more entitled to use and disclose data more widely.  In con-
trast, with opt-out the consent procured is less legitimate than with 
opt-in regimes.  This disparity does not make opt-out consent illegiti-
mate, but it is certainly ambiguous, as opt-out consent might be the 
product of mere inertia or lack of awareness of the option to opt out.  
In the long run, opting in may not even lead to fewer people shar-
ing data.  If companies must obtain opt-in consent, they might also be 
more aggressive about the amount of data that they ask for.84  Data 
collectors may attempt to define potential future uses more broadly 
and vaguely in order to avoid having to obtain new consent in the fu-
ture.  In the end, opt-in is just another version of privacy self-
management, and it suffers from the same underlying problems.  
3.  Should Privacy Self-Management Be Abandoned? — For all its 
flaws, privacy self-management should not be abandoned.  Providing 
people with notice, access, and the ability to control their data is key to 
facilitating some autonomy in a world where decisions are increasingly 
being made about them with the use of personal data, automated pro-
cesses, and clandestine rationales, and where people have minimal 
abilities to do anything about such decisions.  A world without privacy 
self-management would clearly be troublesome, as people should have 
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rights to know about how their data is being used and to make deci-
sions about those uses. 
Moreover, efforts to improve privacy self-management through 
more consumer education, more salient notices, and more choices are 
certainly laudable and important.  Such efforts have been a major le-
gal and policy goal.  In essence, this work is doubling down on self-
management. 
Ironically, perhaps the greatest practical impact of privacy self-
management is not in informing individuals and improving their pri-
vacy management, but in informing the companies that are collecting 
and using the data and in improving the companies’ management of 
privacy.85  The process of creating privacy notices forces internal 
changes within a company, raising self-awareness about data collection 
and use.  Chief Privacy Officers (CPOs) educate personnel to be mind-
ful of privacy and influence software, product, and service design to be 
more privacy friendly.  Privacy self-management thus has the salutary 
effect of creating beneficial structural privacy protections and ac-
countability inside institutions.86 
Privacy self-management should also not be abandoned because 
there are times when people want to manage their privacy, and deny-
ing people this ability can disempower them and constrain their free-
dom.  For example, some people take great care with the privacy  
settings on their social media profile pages.  Some want their profiles 
exposed to the world.  Some want their profiles exposed only to their 
friends.  People in each group might care a lot about their social media 
privacy settings on one particular site yet not bother to look at the pri-
vacy policies at other sites they use. 
Thus, privacy self-management should not be abandoned, and pa-
ternalistic solutions are troubling.  There is no silver bullet, and so we 
must continue to engage in an elaborate dance with the tension be-
tween self-management and paternalism. 
B.  Future Directions 
Although we should not reject privacy self-management, it is cur-
rently asked to bear far more weight than it can support.  So what can 
be done? 
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1.  Rethinking Consent and Employing Nudges. — In order for pri-
vacy regulation to make headway, the law needs a better and more co-
herent approach to consent with respect to privacy.  Indeed, in many 
areas of law, consent plays a critical role, yet what constitutes valid 
consent varies greatly across different areas of law.  Thus far, few have 
attempted to analyze systematically what consent entails and to devel-
op a more coherent approach toward consent.   
Currently, the law has not sufficiently grappled with the social sci-
ence literature that has been teaching us about the complexities and 
challenges involved in human decisionmaking.  What does consenting 
to something really mean?  What should the law recognize as valid 
consent?  Many transactions occur with some kind of inequality in 
knowledge and power.  When are these asymmetries so substantial as 
to be coercive?  The law’s current view of consent is incoherent, and 
the law treats consent as a simple binary (that is, it either exists or it 
does not).  Consent is far more nuanced, and privacy law needs a new 
approach that accounts for the nuances without getting too complex to 
be workable. 
There are also promising ways to mix consent with paternalism.  
For example, Thaler and Sunstein propose forms of “libertarian pater-
nalism,” which they refer to as “nudges,” that seek to architect choices 
so as to change “people’s behavior in a predictable way without for-
bidding any options or significantly changing their economic incen-
tives.”87  Nudges are paternalistic, but not as restrictive and absolute 
as more traditional paternalistic regulation.  In some cases, nudges 
might be a workable middle ground between privacy self-management 
and paternalism. 
2.  Developing Partial Privacy Self-Management. — In essence, 
what many people want when it comes to privacy is for their data to 
be collected, used, and disclosed in ways that benefit them or that ben-
efit society without harming them individually.  If people have an ob-
jection to certain uses of data, they want a right to say no.  But many 
people do not want to micromanage their privacy.  They want to know 
that someone is looking out for their privacy and that they will be pro-
tected from harmful uses. 
With the food we eat and the cars we drive, we have much choice 
in the products we buy, and we trust that these products will fall with-
in certain reasonable parameters of safety.  We do not have to become 
experts on cars or milk, and people do not necessarily want to become 
experts on privacy either.  Sometimes people want to manage their 
privacy in a particular situation, and they should be able to do so.  But 
globally across all entities that gather data, people will likely find self-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
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management to be a nearly impossible task.  People want some priva-
cy self-management, just not too much.  Privacy law needs to find a 
way to deliver partial privacy self-management. 
One possible answer might be to find ways for people to manage 
their privacy globally for all entities rather than one at a time.  But 
unifying such management can be challenging because it will be diffi-
cult to find a uniform set of privacy options that makes sense for all 
entities, and the consequences of data collection, use, or disclosure 
might differ depending upon which entities are involved. 
3.  Adjusting Privacy’s Timing and Focus. — Privacy law’s timing 
needs to be adjusted.  Privacy self-management and the law focus 
heavily on the time of the initial collection of data — and often on 
each individual transaction where data is exchanged.  But it is very 
difficult at the time of data collection for a person to make a sensible 
judgment about the future privacy implications because the implica-
tions are often unknown. 
Therefore, the focus should be more on downstream uses rather 
than on the time of the initial collection of data.  In many cases, bene-
fits might not be apparent at the time the data is collected.  New ideas 
for combining data, new discoveries in data aggregation and analysis, 
and new techniques and technologies of data analysis might change 
the benefits side of the equation.  They might change the costs side  
as well.  Rules that require renewed consent for new uses of data 
might be too prohibitively costly and serve as a de facto bar on these 
uses.  Such an outcome might not be socially desirable, and it might 
not be the outcome preferred by most people whose data is involved.  
On the other hand, blanket consent that allows for a virtually unlim-
ited array of new uses of data can be just as undesirable, as data can 
potentially be used in harmful ways that people might not be able to 
anticipate or understand. 
Moreover, measuring the costs of certain forms of collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal data is extremely difficult because privacy 
harms are so elusive to define.  Ultimately, because of the dynamism of 
this area, assessing costs and benefits requires a fair degree of specula-
tion about the future.  Individuals are likely not able to make such de-
cisions very well in advance, but neither is the law. 
Such decisions would be better made at the time of particular uses 
of data.  What is needed is for the law to weigh in and provide guid-
ance about the types of new uses at the time they are proposed.  Per-
haps some ought to be restricted outright, some ought to be limited, 
some ought to require new consent, some ought to be permitted but 
with a right to revoke consent, and some ought to be permitted with-
out new consent.  Perhaps an agency should review proposals for new 
uses as they arise. 
4.  Moving Toward Substance over Neutrality. — Any way forward 
will require the law to make difficult substantive decisions.  Privacy 
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self-management attempts to remain neutral about the merits of par-
ticular forms of data collection, use, or disclosure and looks merely to 
whether or not there is consent.  Under privacy self-management, most 
forms of data collection, use, or disclosure are acceptable if consensual.  
Consent often becomes a convenient way to reach outcomes without 
confronting the central values at stake.  To move forward, this kind of 
neutrality cannot be sustained. 
The law should develop and codify basic privacy norms.  Such cod-
ification need not be overly paternalistic — it can be in a form like the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), where certain default rules can be 
waived.  The norms of the UCC have become well entrenched and oft 
followed.  Deviations from these norms are quite salient.  Privacy law 
has said far too little about the appropriate forms of collection, use, 
and disclosure of data.  I am not suggesting a paternalistic regime 
where the law rigidly prohibits a wide array of data collection, use, or 
disclosure; only on the outer boundaries should the law do so.  But the 
law must take a stronger stance about substance. 
More substantive rules about data collection, use, and disclosure 
could consist of hard boundaries that block particularly troublesome 
practices as well as softer default rules that can be bargained around.  
Default rules can be crafted in a manner that modulates the ease with 
which parties can bargain around them.  More substantive rules that 
establish a basic set of norms about privacy will make it easier for 
people to understand how their privacy is being protected.  Deviations 
from these norms will be more conspicuous.  The cacophony of differ-
ent approaches to privacy will be lessened.  
CONCLUSION 
For far too long, privacy law has been relying too heavily upon 
privacy self-management.  Privacy self-management cannot achieve 
the goals demanded of it, and it has been pushed beyond its limits.  
But privacy self-management should not be abandoned, and alterna-
tives risk becoming too paternalistic. 
At the core of many privacy issues is the consent dilemma, and too 
often, law, policy, and scholarship ignore it.  The way forward involves 
(1) developing a coherent approach to consent, one that accounts for 
the social science discoveries about how people make decisions about 
personal data; (2) recognizing that people can engage in privacy self-
management only selectively; (3) adjusting privacy law’s timing to fo-
cus on downstream uses; and (4) developing more substantive privacy 
rules.  These are enormous challenges, but they must be tackled.  Oth-
erwise, privacy law will remain stunted while the problems it must 
deal with grow larger and more out of control. 
 
 
